Flying out or driving in?

Sometimes it is argued that flying is something special, for one reason or another, and therefore it should kept out of the EU ETS.  I looked at some of these special characteristics of flying to see if there are grounds for not including aviation emissions in the EU ETS.  And by doing this I realised that the problem is not that flying should be out of the scheme but that driving should be in the scheme.

There are remarkable differences between aviation and most of the other industries in the scheme.

First, flying, the product of aviation, has a higher level appeal than the product of the other basic industries of the EU ETS: flying is part of self-fulfilment and discovery, right at the top of the Maslow pyramid.  Electricity, cement, iron, bricks, sugar, fertiliser and so forth are right at the bottom – food, shelter and warmth.

Second, with the advent of cheap flying, aviation has taken on some symbolism of democracy and egalitarianism.  Now to tax flying is a slap in the face of the man in the street.  Yet it is not so mundane as electricity as to have lost its glamour.

Third, flying is the only industry in the EU ETS where the general public regularly go to the installation.  Few people have actually been to power stations and even fewer to nitric acid plants, but almost everyone has sat in an aeroplane a few metres from the engine.

Fourth, unlike other products covered by the EU ETS, flying draws you in to consuming more of it.  As travel becomes cheaper, we spread our networks: we buy a home in the south of France or our daughter moves to Australia or we start dealing with customers and suppliers on other continents.  With our network thus extended, we have much to lose if flying becomes expensive again.

These characteristics mean that flying is politically sensitive in a way that other products from EU ETS installations are not.  It has become a necessity – not a dull one like electricity, but one which is powerfully symbolic of freedom and wealth.  There is public dismay, a sense of deprivation, if we are threatened with flying becoming more expensive.  The general public does not notice the price of cement.

Does this give political grounds for treating flying separately in emissions policy?  On the face of it, no: it would be an arbitrary decision to favour aviation compared to other industries just because it is politically popular, just because the general public has no idea about the other industries; it would constitute a very regressive subsidy, unjust to those people who do not or cannot fly.

However, if you look at those characteristics of aviation, you realise that another activity shares them: driving your car.  In the same way, the car is a symbol of freedom and a tool for extending our networks.  And emissions from road transport are three or four times those of flying.

So while it is defensible to include aviation in the EU ETS on the grounds that it causes lots of emissions, it is arbitrary to regulate flying but not to regulate driving.

Political pragmatism, not principle, rules here: politicians are too scared of interfering with driving.

To regulate emissions from road transport – whether by tax or by inclusion in the EU ETS – would create a level playing field with flying.  It would also be a sensible move if we want to push the region to a low carbon economy.  Our fear to talk about constraining emissions from road transport amounts to a huge [3] fossil fuel subsidy at a time when we are forcing other industries to constrain their emissions.

 

Postscript

I have heard two weak arguments why aviation should not be in the EU ETS.

First, that the impact of the EU ETS is so insignificant that it is a waste of time to include aviation in the scheme.  This argument is inconsistent with the one that says it is an intolerable burden.  Let’s see: a 1 euro change in the EUA price has the same impact on costs as a 60 US cent [1] change in the oil price per barrel – that is, what we are used to thinking of as a meaningful change in the EUA price is pretty immaterial for an aviation company.  A return flight from London to New York might emit 1.2 tons per passenger.  That implies that a 1 euro increase in the EUA price would impose an extra cost of 1.2 euro on the ticket.  That seems insignificant.

Compare this with electricity.  A 1 euro change in the EUA price would impact the cost of a typical monthly domestic electricity bill by 12p in the UK [2].  Nor is that likely to break the bank.

So retail insignificance would be no more valid reason for excluding aviation than for excluding electricity generation.

The second argument I have heard is that there is no technical possibility for significant further abatement.  This is not unique for aviation.  The manufacture of ammonia, for example, has very limited further possibility for abatement.  And indeed ammonia has fewer substitutes than flying.

In fact, there is an important abatement measure – the one which economists fear most of all: abstention, restraint; that is, not to fly.

Notes

  1. 6.8 barrels of oil in a metric ton.  3.15 tons CO2 per ton of fuel burnt.  1.3 usd per euro.  1 euro change in the EUA price = 1.3 x 3.15 / 6.8 = 60 cent change in oil price.  Approximately.
  2. 3.3 MWh typical household electricity consumption in a year (Ofgen).  0.275 per month.  Assume emissions from electricity production average 0.5 t CO2/Mwh.  Typical emissions therefore 0.138 tons per month per household.  Impact of 1 euro change in EUA price is 14 cents or 12p.
  3. “huge” is not a useful word in discussion environmental policy.  Road transport emissions in the EU are about 900 million tons.  Assuming a carbon price of 4 euro, not putting a carbon price on road transport implies a subsidy, compared to other industry, of 3.6 billion euro.
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The law of the land

Non-compliance with the EU ETS

It is reported that several non-EU aviation companies have not complied with their obligations under the EU ETS.  These companies have made flights within the EU which come under the scope of the EU ETS.  This is not to be confused with flights with one foot in the EU and one foot outside the EU – such flights were exempted from obligations under the EU ETS by the “stop the clock” measure.  No, we are talking about flights which started and finished in the EU.

Member states must impose the normal penalty on those companies.  If they don’t pay, then the normal procedure should be followed whenever an airline owes money to a government body.  A company which does not comply with the EU ETS should be treated like any other company which breaks the law irrespective of where it comes from.

Any delay or indecision about issuing the penalty for non-compliance (100 euro for each EUA not submitted) would have disturbing implications for the rule of law.  If EU member states become selective about which industrial companies they apply the rules of the EU ETS to, Europe’s aviation, industrial and energy companies would be justified in boycotting the system.  The EU ETS could become unmanageable.

The Chinese made it clear that they disapproved of the original scope of the EU ETS when they suspended orders of Airbus aircraft.  At that point in time, the EU’s rule of law became negotiable and it felt forced to compromise for the sake of jobs at Airbus.

The reduced scope of the EU ETS is more reasonable.  If member states sell out on this matter too, then gradually our environmental legislation just becomes an economic convenience with no basis in justice or right and wrong.  Once obeying and enforcing the law both become negotiable and arbitrary, the institution of law loses social or moral legitimacy.  This can spread like an illness.  A region whose law has no legitimacy will quickly become uncivilised.

China, India, Russia and the USA understand the principle that the law must apply evenly to everyone.  The EU has to be uncompromising in defending that principle.

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Ostriches can’t fly

In April 2013 Dr Paul Williams of Reading University and Dr Manoj Joshi of University of East Anglia published a paper on how climate change will increase the incidence of turbulence resulting in additional costs for the aviation industry.

This was one of the very first academic studies on the impact of climate change on aviation.  Search Google for this phrase and you get zillions of documents on the impact of aviation on climate change but very little indeed on the impact on aviation of climate change.

It is interesting that the aviation industry has been so vociferous in opposing efforts to cut emissions without actually having quantified the impact on their business of not cutting emissions.  This does not speak well for the intellectual curiosity of their accountants!

It would be a good idea to bring climate and meteorological academics together with aviation experts and economists and really dig into this question.  Airlines should be energetic in evaluating the financial and strategic impact of climate changes on their businesses.  Failure to do that is, at least, a serious disservice to their shareholders.

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Another case of the dismal quality of administration of the EU ETS

An aviation client agreed to send us EUAs.  It initiated the transfer of allowances to us on 1st March 2013.  The transfer never arrived.  What could be wrong?  Is the registry system not working again?

After some investigation it turns out that:

(i) The client had opted to go for “stop the clock” and would return the EUAAs relating to non-EU flights to the “competent” authority.

(ii) Therefore the European Commission blocked their account to prevent them making any outward transfers before the registry operator opened a new account for sending back the EUAAs.

(iii) The authorities failed to tell the airline that it had blocked the account.  The airline was only sent a letter dated 7th March 2013, some six days after the aborted transfer.

Just another example of the shambolic communication by the people responsible for running the EU ETS, resulting in working capital being tied up in the system and additional costs, risk and frustration for the parties involved.

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Late allocation is symptomatic of a deeper problem: the governance of the EU ETS

Each year companies in the EU Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) receive an allocation of free allowances.  The due date for issuing the allowances is 28th February.  Member states, as the so-called “competent” authorities are obliged to issue these allowances by 28th February.  This year the allocation has not happened and there is no information on when it is to be expected.  Digging beneath the surface this points to grave problems with the scheme.

The free allocation is late.  Once again the shambolic governance of the EU ETS is exposed.  Tardiness of member states and secretive dealings behind the darkened windows of the Commission have combined to ensure that the authorities are unable to calculate in time and agree on the number of allowances to be allocated for free.  Although the EU ETS Directive clearly states that by 28th February the competent authorities shall issue the free allocation to operators of installations, it did not happen.  Further, the Commission is unable to give any new deadline for the allocation.

There are several problems with this, described in the following.

Jobs and commerce are put at risk

First, it makes life very difficult for a number of operators who have acted in good faith and assumed that, this not being Zimbabwe, the authorities can be relied on to meet their own legal obligations.  There are some operators whose very existence depends on this allocation: short of Phase 2 allowances and with financing difficulties, they are dependent on receiving the allocation on time to be able to raise funds to buy Phase 2 allowances for compliance.  There are other operators which have made commercial arrangements which involve the delivery of Phase 3 allowances, for example for financing or trading purposes.  With the total uncertain about when the allocation will happen these operators are left in the lurch and their commercial dealings are frustrated.  Some might well have to close with resulting losses of livelihoods.

Lots of uncertainty is only good for speculators

Second, uncertainty remains and uncertainty feeds price volatility.  Yet the Commission refuses to commit to a new date.  Now some analysts believe that the free allocation will not happen until the summer.  This fundamental uncertainty is good for speculative traders only.  However much politicians might rail against speculators, they only have themselves to blame for the rich pickings which speculators make over bureaucratic dithering.

Companies cannot plan

Third, well-run businesses need to plan their operations.  The whole idea of the EU ETS is that the cost of carbon should be integrated into businesses’ decision-making.  Yet today, more than two months into the year, companies cannot finalise their budgets and EU ETS compliance plans because they do not know how many free allowances to count on.

Suspicion that there is more to it than incompetence

Fourth, uncertainty gives rise to suspicion.  Is the Commission deliberately delaying the free allocation because it is frustrated at its inability to cut supply of allowances by rescheduling auctions?  Could it be part of a Plan B for boosting the carbon price?  Since the Commission does not communicate clearly and openly, such suspicion is only natural.

The rule of law is undermined

Finally, the rule of law.  Our society is based on the rule of law.  This means that when there are laws they have to be observed and enforced.  Here we see that the Commission has an untenable conflict of interest.  The way the EU works is that the Commission should start proceedings against the member states for the late allocation.  But since the Commission is complicit in the late allocation, it can hardly start such an action.  Thus, not only do the authorities break their own law, they are also never going to do anything about that.

If the authorities do not enforce their laws then we lose confidence in the law and in the institutions of the state.  As a result, those that abide by the law are at a disadvantage, and chaos is likely to follow: one day a company somewhere will fail to comply, the member state will arbitrarily waive the fine because its own authority is at fault, and this will unleash such a tsunami of legal action that the scheme will be fatally wounded.

Who is responsible and what do they say?

The delay has happened because member states have been slow in providing the Commission with the necessary data, because of lack of resources, lack of political priority or squabbles between vested interests.  Clearly member states and the Commission are both at fault.

According to the Directive, the strict responsibility for timely allocation lies with the member states (articles 3e (5) and 11 (2)).  But the Commission is instrumental in the process and thus is also responsible.  When you put the question of the late allocation to them, the (unofficial) response is that “as Phase 3 allowances cannot be used for compliance with 2012 emissions there is no pressing need for putting these allowances in circulation.”

I drew two conclusions from this:

First, the Commission does not respect the mechanism which it set up.  It has knowingly set up a market mechanism with all the ramifications of a market.  It should assume that participants in the market will take advantage of every opportunity afforded by a reasonable interpretation of the rules.  The fact that it is oblivious to companies which are dependent on timely allocation shows that it does not really understand or respect the very system that it has constructed.

Second, the Commission feels that there is no problem about being late with the free allocation.  But there is a problem, because the law sets a date of 28th February.  I see that the Commission feels that it is above the law and has the right to observe or ignore parts of the law as it sees fit.

This blasé and irresponsible attitude to the law by the Commission and, for that matter, member states will come to haunt them.  History repeats itself.

A question of governance

This is not the only problem with the EU ETS and it is important to look beyond free allocation.  VAT fraud, stealing of allowances, incompetent choices on software, IT failure, a poorly designed registry, panicky and arbitrary rule-making on the use of Kyoto credits, damaging delays over dealing with the question of oversupply, and amateurish communication are other serious problems from the last eight years.  Something is gravely wrong with the way that the EU ETS is managed – something to do with the multiple conflicting roles that the Commission takes on to initiate, implement, operate and evaluate the system; and something to do with the dysfunctional relationship between the Commission and the member states.

What should be done?

Neither the Commission nor the member states respect the laws they have created.  We are let down by our politicians and bureaucrats who are unwilling to abide by their own rules.  We can draw our own conclusions about the calibre and fibre of the individuals responsible.

There are three levels at which to address the issue.  First, as member states are in breach of their obligations under the EU ETS, the Commission should issue proceedings against them and see that they are fined for failure to comply.  It is like the pot calling the kettle black, but that seems to be the proper process.

Second, we need proper governance of the EU ETS.  This needs to receive far more emphasis in the forthcoming discussions on structural reform of the scheme.  Because the Commission would lose political power in the event of any governance reform, they have been carefully avoiding that question by focusing structural reform on the question of price management.

Reform of the governance would involve a separation between responsibility for supervising and operating the scheme.  It would involve the right to impose strong fines for delays and mal-administration.  To overcome the many conflicts of interest and unspoken loyalties within Brussels, independent experts need to be involved in supervision of the scheme.  Civil organisations and operators need to have the right to sue the authorities for failure to observe their own laws, and need strong support from the courts in this.

Both the people and organisations running it and the member states are too conflicted for the scheme to flourish.  Reform in the governance of the EU ETS is urgently needed.

Finally, if you dig even deeper you see that all these problems stem from one thing: politicians in member states want a scheme but they are scared that if it works too well, it will harm the economy; or, in some cases, harm their own interests.  If they were enthusiastic about the scheme they would not let the Commission get away with its bumbling and they would make sure that their competent authorities worked smoothly with the Commission.  It is vital to continue to try to resolve this apparently fundamental political and economic dilemma.  Without that the scheme will always be hobbled by political compromise.

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